Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Type/Token Identity, philosophy: type identity and token identity are modes of the identity theory which assumes that mental states or processes are identical to physical states or processes. According to the type-identity, however, the correspondence is not at the level of the individual events, but at the level of more generally described types of occurrences. See also identity theory, physicalism, token-physicalism, type-physicalism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Hartry Field on Type /Token Identity - Dictionary of Arguments
II 57 Psychology/type-identity/Field: type-identity needs a relation: "two inner occurrences c and d within an organism are of the same type if and only if there is a physical relation R between them, to an appropriate component of the single realization of f in X. t and c in R is to d." N.B.: this relation must not be specified. Psychology/Field: psychology does not need a notion of type-identity between events in different organisms within an organism. >Type/Token, >Relations, >Behavior, >Behaviorism, >Explanations, >Observation, >Theories, >Generalization._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |
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> Counter arguments against Field
> Counter arguments in relation to Type /Token Identity
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27